The Populist in Power

In opposition to the paradigm that populist parties are fundamentally unqualified in the field of governance, there have been some facts that argue that they can make good officials and participate in mainstream governing practices. In a study of ministerial advisers in Norway, it was discovered that the populists appointed personnel with ample professional experience to office, adhered to collegial decision making, and thought the bureaucracy delivered quality and was politically responsive. This means that, upon entering the government, populist parties have a practical interest in making themselves competent to meet strategic interests. What is more, the research showed that there was no significant distinction between the perception of the populist and the non-populist advisers concerning such forms of collegial decision making as those related to the cabinet meetings or committees. The populists followed the already existing and consensus-focused customs of Norwegian cabinets to imply that the institutional structure of governance can have a normalizing influence. This type of normalized behavior is also applied to their evaluation of the permanent bureaucracy that is frequently rhetorically demonized as a part of the corrupt elite by the populist parties. The Norwegian populist advisers also expressed that their portfolios of civil servants needed to possess the same quality of “political responsiveness” and “quality of written material” as the advisers of any other party (Askim et al. 739). The conclusion conflicts with the exceptionalism approach, which assumes a strong distrust and antagonistic attitude towards the administrative state.

However, the seeming normalcy of governance capacity and practice covers the long history of exceptionalism regarding the ways populists formulate and practice the politics of representation. This exceptionalism can be consistent with the principles of populism of acting as a purported exclusive monopoly as representing the true people, having a moralizing form of anti-elitism, and having profound distrust towards intermediary institutions. Although administrative normality prevailed in the Burning Norwegian case, there appeared to be marked variations in the contact patterns of the populists and the communication issues that concerned them. Populist advisers were less in touch with the leaders and caseworkers in the civil service and more in touch with their own political party. This is evidence of a policy position of retaining an outsider status in government, which Webber attributes to the populist desire to separate their pure adherents from the corrupt establishment. This “one foot in, one foot out” (Askim et al. 733) strategy enables the party to engage in policymaking while still being able to express the grievances of the disillusioned electorate with an accent on public office.

Communication is the area of prime exceptionalism. A Norwegian study revealed that, unlike other advisers, populist advisers were conscious of how the government is presented in the media. However, “appear in a good light in news stories about the ministry’s policy area” (Askim et al. 742). Such a preference for party image over state institutions indicates another one of the significant principles of the logic of populism, that a party is regarded as the will of the people. Using the examples of populists, such as Jan-Werner Müller, when they proclaim to possess a moral monopoly on representation, they view any institution that contradicts them as an illegitimate form of representation. The result of this is what Webber termed as impatience with institutional processes that promote pluralism and compromise, which would only serve as a point of resistance in implementing the popular will. In politics, “It is quite controversial that while populism claims the ‘true representation’ of people” (Webber 859) and, in that regard, a more perfect realization of people’s sovereignty.

The conflict between the normality of the behavior and ideological exceptionalism compels the redefinition of democracy itself. The thing is not that populism is simply an external danger to democracy, but, according to Weber, an intensification of problems constructed into a self-government by democracy. Populists exploit the inherent issue in democratizing the creation of a singular “people’s voice”, comprising a multiplicative and disparate citizenry, by purporting to have a direct and unmediated appeal to a unitary popular opinion (Webber 863). Such a statement is necessarily anti-pluralist, which denies the right to disbelieve and criticize. As such, when it is the case that a Populist Party such as the Progress Party in Norway is acting

The Norwegian case can be a serious challenge to populist exceptionalism. The Progress Party was also a relatively established player that had long experience in local government before venturing into the national government. This exposure probably led to the normal functioning of governance. Populist movements that lack expertise or have radical ideologies may be expected to exhibit more pronounced exceptionalism. Moreover, because senior leaders in the country have shared the benefit of being in government, the spill-over effect may not flow down to the grassroots of the party's power, which may continue to be laden with anti-system sentiments. The question of longevity of normalization is also doubtful; even the traits formed during the time in office may decline after the viable time in opposition, and the party can revert to exceptionalism.

Finally, there is a paradox with the experience of populists in government. They may be normal in aspects of administrative competence and formal decision-making procedures, as the Norwegian case demonstrates, in properly running the state apparatus. However, their central ideological devotion to being the only legitimate representative of the people breeds a long-term exceptionalism in their political actions. Such exceptionalism is expressed through a communication policy that puts the party above the state and an inbuilt distrust of pluralistic institutions. It is not a challenge of overwhelming incompetence, the populist challenge, but rather, in part, a challenge of more fundamental subversion of the liberal democratic ethos of disagreement, compromise, and institutional checks and balances.